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GENERALIZATION IN CHESS THINKING 
Giuliano D’Eredità and Mario Ferro 
In this work we deal with generalization in chess thinking. Generalization is a 
complex process based on information people acquired during previous 
experiences. In the field of chess, chess books, chess education and personal 
game practice supply the information for generalization to occur. The way in 
which generalization is performed in chess is still a topic that deserves more 
research. In this article we dwell on early theories about chess thinking. We 
underline the role played by what we call configural concepts, in which 
geometrical patterns and logical expected developments coexist. We suggest 
that the idea of configural concepts, along with generalization and abduction 
constitute the basis of chess thinking. 
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Tactics 
Generalización en el pensamiento al jugar ajedrez 
En este trabajo abordamos la generalización en el pensamiento en el juego 
del ajedrez. La generalización es un complejo proceso basado en información 
adquirida durante experiencias previas. En el campo del ajedrez, los libros 
de ajedrez, la educación en el ajedrez y la práctica personal con el juego 
aportan la información que posibilita la generalización. La forma en que la 
generalización se produce en el ajedrez es todavía un tema que merece más 
investigación. En este artículo consideramos teorías tempranas sobre el 
pensamiento en el ajedrez. Subrayamos el papel que juegan lo que llamamos 
conceptos configurales, en los cuales coexisten los patrones geométricos y 
desarrollos lógicos esperados. Sugerimos que la idea de conceptos 
configurales, junto con la generalización y la abducción constituyen la base 
del pensamiento en el ajedrez.  
Términos clave: Abducción; Conceptos configurales; Estrategia; Generalización; 
Pensamiento en el ajedrez; Táctica 
Psychologists have very often stressed the role of perception in chess. Perception, 
which we discuss in the first section of this article, plays a fundamental role in 
strategy and tactics, both considered the main types of chess thinking. In both, 
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strategy and tactics, generalization is fundamental because the next moves the player 
has to play are frequently chosen from previous knowledge. The player has to 
generalize previous knowledge and adapt it to the context at hand. Such endeavour 
implies a complete or partial pattern recognition. The pattern has not to be considered 
merely something static. It is rather a dynamic aspect linked to expected developments 
in a game. It is this dynamic aspect of chess thinking that we try to capture through 
the idea of configural concepts in the second section of this article. The dynamic 
aspects involve specific, technical chess concepts the player acquires in the course of 
time, but of course subjective beliefs and personal experiences are relevant too.  
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF CHESS THINKING AND THE ROLE OF 
PERCEPTION 
Chess was called the drosophila of the Psychology, because of its specific 
characteristics, especially the rules worldwide accepted and a sharp universal rating of 
expertise, called the ELO system. A fundamental study was carried out by Adrian De 
Groot in 1965. He was the first scholar to carry out an experimentally based 
psychological analysis of chess thinking (De Groot, 1965). An important topic in his 
study dealt with the ability to recall a position. Masters performed significantly better 
only if positions made sense, that is, if they represented a chess position that could 
occur in a standard game. When pieces were set randomly there was no difference 
between masters and beginners. There is a semantic or meaning field that organizes 
recollection. De Groot understood the role of perceiving complex of pieces, a key item 
that was studied by important scholars in the subsequent decades. Another aspect 
investigated by De Groot was the structure of chess thought by searching for the 
features underlying skills and talent. Somewhat surprisingly, chess masters did not 
show a clear superiority in depth analysis, or in the number of variations analyzed. 
More recent studies show that experts analyze slightly deeper than non experts 
(Gobet, 1998, p. 28), indicating that depth analysis is not the characteristic of skilled 
chess players. 
Chess skill reveals in early finding/troubleshooting and in selecting the right 
variations to analyze. It recalls the way minimax and alfabeta algorithms proceed. 
This finding and selection are enhanced by players’ chess knowledge.  
De Groot identified the critical role of perception, which allows quick access to 
information stored in long-term memory (Gobet & Campitelli, 2002, p. 106). 
Perception in chess seems driven by expertise. We know anyway that similar results 
about perception were also found in different disciplines.  
More in general, protocols in De Groot’s study show some typical features in 
chess thinking, summarized as follows (Di Sario, 2002, p. 28).  
♦ Identification of the problem(s). 
♦ Various levels of depth, according to a classical tree-structure.  
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♦ Players always look for a subjective reason of choice. 
♦ Players apply a continuous feedback mechanism (goal feedback). 
♦ The feedback mechanism may cause a radical change of the problem itself, and 
of the ways to tackle it. 
It is at the third bullet that forms of generalization appear, as we will develop in the 
following. 
 Another milestone in understanding chess thinking was set by Chase and Simon 
(1973a, p. 80), proposing their famous chunking theory to explain De Groot’s results, 
also using Jongman’s results on chess players’ ocular movements (Jongman, 1968, p. 
187). The chunking theory is a model of chess players’ perception. The chunk is a 
typical piece ensemble, immediately recognized by the skilled player, and perceived 
as a whole. In the Figure 1 an example of chunk is shown: the typical King’s 
fianchetto (white pieces in the bottom right corner). 
	  
Figure 1. Example of chunk 
For the skilled chess player, the white pieces’ ensemble occupies an elementary unit 
of memory. Then the player skimps on his or her own memory space. It does not 
happen to beginner chess players; they use more bits of memory to recall the chunk. 
Chunking is a cognitive resource for chess skill, in particular in tasks of recalling a 
position. 
This is the first concept for understanding the processes of pattern recognition in 
chess. Pattern recognition is considered the most important cognitive resource, as 
confirmed in almost all relevant chess studies. 
It is clear again that chunking is strictly connected with knowledge and practice, 
otherwise test results about recalling a position would be hard to explain. Chunks are 
supposed to be stored in long-term memory. 
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Through years of practice and study, masters have learnt several hundred 
thousands of perceptual patterns, which, once recognized in a particular 
position, give rapid access to information such as potential moves or move 
sequences, tactics, strategies, and so on. Simon and his colleagues proposed 
that pattern recognition explains a number of important phenomena, such as 
highly selective search (even chess grandmasters rarely search through more 
than one hundred moves before selecting a move), automatic and “intuitive” 
discovery of good moves, and extraordinary memory for game-like chess 
positions. Chase and Simon (1973a, p. 56) suggested that at least ten years of 
practice and study were necessary to acquire the minimum knowledge 
required to become a grandmaster. (Gobet & Campitelli, 2002, p. 106) 
 Chunks are surely a form of generalization, a visual generalization. 
Another, very interesting, theoretical item proposed by Chase and Simon (1973b) 
is the so-called mind’s eye. In a nutshell, mind’s eye is a model of chess problem 
solving. The player solves the problems making in mind visuo-spatial operations. It’s 
an active mental imagery. In fact players often use the typical sentence “I saw it”, 
meaning the discovery of a move. However, they do not refer to a real visual 
operation, but to a kind of perception similar to the one of the mathematician who, 
walking after hours of work on a problem, suddenly “sees” the solution. By the 
mind’s eye theory, chess players solve problems in a visual-perceptive way. Is it a 
rational, deductive approach? We believe that it is, but certainly not a classical one. 
The mind’s eye is a very interesting theoretical structure with potential links with 
other disciplines, including mathematics, and is useful to better understand chess 
thinking. 
Coming back to the basic structure of chess thinking as summarized by De Groot, 
skilled players use to select the more plausible options, and then analyze them trough 
and trough. It is a deep visit of the tree, performed in a classical, deductive manner. 
This way of operating, which we believe is reasonable, is supported by players’ 
reports after tournament games and by tests from the most important and classical 
chess books. Moreover, chess players are able to verbally reconstruct their thoughts, 
even if their reports are sometimes not so clear as their moves on the board. This 
aspect is highlighted also by Montero and Evans (2011, p. 187), in arguing versus 
Herbert Dreyfus’ theory of expertise, that expert action generally occurs automatically 
and unreflectively. 
Dreyfus (2005, p. 25) argues that experts’ actions are based on intuitions and, 
although proceeding in a very effective way, are taken without full consciousness of 
deliberation, as a pilot driving a race car or someone`s climbing his/her home’s stairs. 
The argument is subtle because the great players’ moves seem often part of an 
automatic, spontaneous flow, especially during rapid games, albeit this is true only in 
some phases of the game. 
On the other hand, in different phases of the game, a logic, deliberate, and 
sometimes very deep analysis occurs in tournament practice, as highlighted by 
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Montero and Evans quoting Larry Evans’ report of one of his own games. The Evans 
report is logic, verbal and, indeed, reconstructs apparently correctly his thoughts 
during the game, showing a full awareness and not any kind of “automatic pilot”. We 
concur with Montero and Evans’ opinion. It does not seem appropriate to reduce chess 
reasoning to a sort of automatic retrieval and application of information. The player 
recognizes configurations and considers his/her experiences, but the analysis proceeds 
in an analytical way, and only eventually heuristic and synthetic considerations are 
made (D’Eredità, 2012, p. 54). Just in specific standardized positions, playing is 
somewhat automatic. Several generalized concepts concur in the player’s mind. 
Within the psychological theoretical framework of Gestalt, humans’ perception of 
reality is considered to be not a sensorial mosaic, but a synthesis, a structural unit. 
This form, the Gestalt, may be the main human model of reality. Gestalt is depicted by 
perception, and learning consists in the perception of a situation, recognition of its 
troubling aspects, and its solution obtained by perceptive insight (D’Eredità, 2012, p. 
55).  
Now, knowledge and culture do not come after perception, intervening a 
posteriori, but in our opinion they interact at the same time, in a complex and dynamic 
occurrence. Indeed, “rather than being a purely biological act, human perception is a 
social process through and through. It is a cultural artifact shaped by our own 
historically changing practices” (Wartofsky, 1984, p. 865). 
As mentioned in the introduction, usually, chess thinking is roughly divided in 
strategic and tactical thinking. One strategy is the formulation, even in an implicit 
form, of a plan of action which, even on a long term basis, is taken as a reference for 
the coordination of the activities addressed to the reaching of a predetermined goal. 
The word strategy is derived from ancient Greek and meant general (στρατηγός). The 
first necessary option is precisely the determination of the goals, that is, the explicit 
identification of the objectives on the basis of an evaluation of the situation. Strategy 
in chess is based on experiences, knowledge and beliefs, and strongly influences the 
evaluation, i.e. the choice of the next move(s). 
Tactics comprise the methods used for achieving established objectives. Tactics 
are the means, real or logical, used to obtain a goal, be it partial or total (D’Eredità & 
Spagnolo, 2009, p. 265). A tactical operation has the goal of realising a single action 
within the strategy, or also for gathering possibilities offered by an adversary or from 
the physical or logical environment in which it is found. A famous Tartakower1 motto 
is “Tactics is knowing what to do when you have something to do; strategy is 
knowing what to do when you don’t have anything to do” (Schoenberg, 1975, p. 127). 
Tactics in chess means concrete sequences of moves. 
An advantageous tactical operation, which stands out can convince one to 
decisively change his formulated strategic plans if necessary. 
                                                
1 Savielly Tartakower (1887-1956) was one of the strongest chess player of all time. Although he 
never earned the title of World Champion, he is remembered for his chess studies and publications. 
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The evaluation phase is perhaps the most delicate and depends on the data at 
hand, on the decision-making ability of the subject in terms of aptitude, experience, 
and knowledge. Here, abduction and generalization are present. The player recognizes 
in the position he is facing some basic details that allow him to link or insert the 
position itself in a sort of known class. This is abduction. The appearance of known 
patterns, both visual and logical, helps lead the player in this kind of process. As a 
consequence of this abduction, the choice of the next move(s) depends greatly on the 
behaviour of that class, i.e. on its known outcomes. This is generalization. In fact, the 
player relies on these behaviours, and on how much effective is the generalization he 
is concerned with.  
In fact, frequently in chess, beliefs change, often as a consequence of a complete 
or partial failure of a generalization. We must walk a thin line between flexibility and 
consistency (Kasparov, 2007, p. 38). Furthermore, it is not trivial to emphasize that 
the abduction processes mentioned above may be multiple, i.e. a position could be 
considered as belonging to various of the so called classes..., therefore the consequent 
behavior it is not so easy to forecast. Chess is not a simple game. These mechanisms 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
GENERALIZATION AND CONFIGURAL CONCEPTS 
From an epistemological point of view, the cognitive functions involved in chess 
visual processes are somewhat different from the geometrical ones. The concepts are 
not the same in those fields. Although in a given chess position all the visual 
information is directly accessible, the visual information conceals conceptual 
relationships that have been culturally created and refined by generations of 
individuals over years of chess practice. 
Among these conceptual relationships, we are interested in investigating those 
characterized by spatial and conceptual relationships between particular pieces, with 
other pieces on the chessboard, and the chessboard itself. It is this idea that the 
concept of configural concept tries to capture. 
A configural concept is made up of chess objects and their conceptual 
relationships. Its meaning comes from the hierarchical linkage of the conceptual 
relationships between the involved chess objects and from its position in the whole 
theoretical structure of the pieces in the chessboard (Ferro, 2012, p. 15). 
The use of a configural concept depends on the goal that an individual is pursuing 
in a chess game. It involves the identification of general structure of the game at a 
certain moment and the role of the configural concept therein. In terms of learning, 
configural concepts become noticed and valued through a process in which the student 
becomes conscious of the chess objects and their conceptual mutual relations (Ferro, 
2013, p. 5). This process is what Radford calls objectification (Radford, 2010a, p. 3). 
In this regard, one of the fundamental skills developed by chess players is to 
configure and reconfigure chess objects in order to invoke different configural 
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concepts and then produce different evaluations of a position. It is a process of 
continuous construction and deconstruction (Di Sario, 2002, p. 35). 
So chess players improve the ability of disclosing the correct and useful 
configural concepts and manipulating them with the purpose of achieving a goal. 
Due to the fact that the meaning of a configural concept depends strongly on 
figural and conceptual relationships between chess object involved in it and from its 
position in the whole theoretical structure of the pieces in the chessboard, the 
generalization of a configural concept occurs through two different processes. 
♦ The first one—we will call it the productive process—consists of processes of 
induction in which the individual observes and describes the communal and 
distinctive characters of particular positions, extending them to a representative 
pattern. 
♦ The second one—we will call it the decisional process—consists of processes 
of deduction in which the player makes decision in the game and evaluate the 
positions, in this way he/she gain awareness about the configural concept in the 
whole theoretical structure of the game.  
To explain these concepts we will analyze the example in the position in Figure 2 (the 
Réti endgame), in which white seems to have no chance to draw the match because its 
king is too “far away” to help promoting its pawn or to stop the opponent one. On the 
contrary, by passing the squares g7, f6, e5, the king could draw the game promoting 
its pawn or taking the opponent pawn.  
To solve correctly this position, the players must recognize and handle the 
configural concept that synthesizes the idea of distance in this kind of chess 
endgames: the square rule. Its use, supported by a strongly figural sense (the square 
shape), gives to the square rule a hierarchical position on the visualization processes 
in this kind of endgames. In this case, the decisional process consists of the deductive 
processes in which the player associate square rule in a precise moment of the game, 
to a result: win, lose, draw, good, bad, uncertain. These processes are mostly 
linguistic, and during the processes of generalization the statements move from 
personal ones like “I didn’t like to play these positions” or “I didn’t understand these 
positions”, to the categorial ones like “this game is lost/won”. 
G. D’Eredità, and M. Ferro 252 
	  
Figure 2. The Réti endgame show the diagonal idea and the square rule in the 
endgame of king and pawns 
Let’s study the examples in Figure 3 to better understand the idea of productive 
processes in generalization. In those endgames (white to move) the black king cannot 
prevent the promotion of the white pawn because the king is too far away from the 
promotion square. However, this aspect could be hidden by other figural aspects. 
In the first position, the black king is behind the white pawn and in the second 
position the white King obstructs the passage of black King. Thus, the chess player, 
playing, studying or simply observing these kinds of endgames, will compare them 
generalizing the configural concept (correctly or not).  
Let’s try to show how a chess player could become aware of the configural 
concept of square rule. By definition, the square rule is based on the idea of distance 
—an idea that in chess is different from the idea of distance of Euclidean geometry. 
The endgame in Figure 2 is an example in which the figural aspect of distance in 
chess generates a problematic situation. 
As we shown in Figures 3a and 3b the chess player can initially think that the king 
can’t reach the enemy pawn because it is behind the pawn, or obstructed by the other 
king, referring thereby to relationships between pieces. 
As we have had the opportunity to observe again and again in our work as chess 
teachers, in the course of chess practice the novice chess player may become 
progressively aware of the fact that there are also other aspects to be noticed other 
than distances. This awareness occurs in what Radford (2002, p. 14) calls a process of 
objectification. As a result of it, the chess player may change what he/she is looking 
for: from relationships between pieces the player may also include in his/her analysis 
relationships involving pieces and the chessboard. In this way he/she will compare 
distance (chess distance) between pieces and zones of the chessboard and he/she will 
endows these zones with conceptual considerations (in this case a square with the 
enemy pawn as vertex). 









Figure 3. Four endgames with king and pawn vs king and the square rule 
To investigate this phenomenon in chess teaching and learning, we study the evolution 
of particular semiotic means of objectification (e.g., words, gestures, perception). We 
observe that in gaining awareness about a chess object, the students change or refine 
the use of the semiotic means of objectification. 
[…] in lower level of awareness the student use the gesture to point squares, 
to keep in hand pieces or to tap them over the chessboard. These gestures (in 
particular the pointing gestures) were modified (or simply contracted) into 
his eyes action. When he achieved highest level of awareness he moved his 
eyes and his head to individuate the squares on the chessboard without using 
gestures. […] By the way these eyes’ motions were not “alone”, they were 
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coordinated with the language that the student improved in “calling” the 
columns or the squares. (Ferro, 2013, pp. 104-105) 
Furthermore, the chess player can be aware of the square rule if he/she knows the 
promotion rule (the pawn in last row can become rook, knight, bishop or queen) and 
knowing the elementary endgames (endgames involving king vs king and piece). 
Through these processes, the chess player can recognize and evaluate the square rule 
in the position, and so become aware of it. 
Notice that the idea of promotion has not been always the same and, as a result of 
its historical transformation, it has changed the idea of the square rule too. For 
example in the 18th century the Pawn could only be promoted into the piece of the 
column on which it is promoted or on which it started. So in the 18th century, if the 
Pawn was in b-file, the promotion of the pawn did not ensure the victory of the game 
because the endgame king and knight vs king is a draw. 
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 
As we said before, generalization in chess involves induction and deduction. Chess 
players apply deduction when using a specific rule to make a choice in a given 
position (e.g., in endgames with king and pawn vs king, if the pawn reaches the 
promotion square, the player can use the specific rule “king and queen or king and 
rook do win against the king alone”, to decide to promote the pawn into a queen or a 
Rook). Chess player uses induction when starting from a position (e.g., black in 
Figure 3a) and observing an outcome (the king cannot stop the promotion of the pawn, 
losing the game), he/she produces and generalizes a rule, in this case “when the king 
is behind the enemy pawn, the pawn cannot be blocked”. So we can say that 
decisional generalization involves deductive inferences, and productive generalization 
involves inductive inferences. 
A chess player uses abduction when starting from an unexpected enemy move 
(e.g., a piece sacrifice) he/she supposes some rules that could justify that move, trying 
to see the same position through the opponent’s eyes. In fact, the move in a chess 
game could be seen as a hypothesis “I believe that this is the best move in this position 
and against this opponent”, but to prove it, he/she has to wait until the opponent’s 
move to confirm or invalidate the hypothesis. 
Chess players need to generalize and to evoke configural concepts to understand a 
position and make a choice. It forces chess players to make continuous deductions, 
inductions and abductions. 
The concepts he/she evokes are strongly depending on culture in general, in chess 
culture in particular. In fact chess knowledge is continuously changing and, as a 
consequence of it, the assessment of a given position or opening may change in the 
course of time. Obviously, in each step of the game, the chess player does not describe 
all the conceptual relationships that may arise. However, these relationships are 
embodied in figural patterns, some of which become more salient than others in the 
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processes of chess knowledge objectification. These processes may generate some 
paradoxes: an expert chess player often knows the correct move in some position, but 
he/she doesn’t know why it is the best move. In a specific example, an endgame with 
king and pawn vs king, the expert chess player motivates a move talking about spatial 
advantage that is totally wrong without a pawn structure (Ferro, 2012, p. 23). Just 
analyzing the position more in detail she/he very probably will change the move. 
EVALUATION AND GENERALIZATION IN CHESS: STUDY OF AN 
EXAMPLE 
In this paragraph we want to discuss the relationships among configural concepts, 
generalization, tactics and strategy. We will analyze the example shown in Figure 4 
that represents a position played in the game Stein-Bronstein (Dvoretsky, 1991, p. 82). 
	  
Figure 4. Stein-Bronstein, Moscow 1971 
How does a chess player evaluate this position? How does he/she find the moves 
and/or the best variation? 
To find these answers we will use separately the tactical and strategically 
approach. To use a tactical approach means to look at some chess objects (pieces and 
squares), match them to one or more configural concepts and then calculate if they 
could be useful in this concrete case. Referring to the position in Figure 4 we consider 
the pattern in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. A pattern extracted from Figure 4 
This pattern involves some fundamental elements:  
1. Black has castled with fianchetto (pawns f7, g6 and h7, and bishop in g7) 
2. White has some major pieces (queen or rook) in an opened line (in the 
example, the e line) 
3. White has a bishop that can go in the h6 square, and 
4. Black has the 8th rank weak, i.e. black has not control enough of the 8th rank.  
The idea in this pattern is that white can capture the Knight on e8, sacrifying the 
Queen, and so after 1.QxKe8 RxQe8, 2.RxRe8 Bf8, 3.Bh6 with the threat RxBh8 
checkmate. 
But in the position in Figure 4 there is a knight in e4, so white has to analyze how 
to move it along the e line to reach the discussed pattern. Obviously 1.Nxd6 or 1.Nf6+ 
are not good because the knight in e8 can take that piece and escapes from e line. So, 
the white need to find a good place to move the knight by e4. After some trial 
considerations we can affirm that the best move is 1.NxPc5 and then after 1…QxNc5 
or 1…PxNc5 the white can play 2.QxNe8 gaining a pawn in this trade. However, 
continuing with the variation, it seems that 1.NxPc5 is not really good because after 
2…Bg4, 3.Qb5 Qxb5, 4.PxQb5 BxRd1, 5.RxBd1 Rb7 is not clear (Dvoretsky, 1991, 
p.82).  
If the chess player uses a strategically approach he/she finds out some configural 
concepts from the position and then configures the pieces in order to achieve one or 
more goals. Referring to the Figure 4, white can evaluate the position as shown in 
Figure 6. In this operation we can underline the weakness of pawn in d6, the bad 
position of rook in a7 and the bishop in c8. Also white has space advantage and 
his/her pieces are well placed on the center of the board so he/she can manoeuvre the 
pieces easily. In this case a proper move for white is 1.Qg3 attacking the pawn d6 and 
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forcing the black to move the rook in d7 and then block the movement of bishop c8, 
so after 1…Rd7 a good idea is 2.h4 and improve the space advantage and pressing on 
black castle. 
	  
Figure 6. A strategic evaluation of position in Figure 4 
These two examples show that there is not a unique way to deal with a position. There 
is not a unique evaluation of the position and every evaluation produce different plans, 
ideas and variations. In the position in Figure 4 stein played 1.NxPc5 and he preferred 
this variation to the other ones. He thought that this position belonged to those 
positions in which white achieves concrete results based on his/her positional 
superiority by a tactical approach. What we want to emphasize is that, according to 
these considerations, the evaluation of a chess position could be considered as a 
process of abduction and generalization. First, the chess player finds out some 
configural concepts and decides that the position belongs to a class of positions 
(abduction), and so he/she can produce a move or a complete variation, based on an 
expected common behavior (generalization). 
This is what we called above decisional generalization. The relationships among 
patterns and ideas, considerations, moves, etc. are built in the process of productive 
generalization, in which the players playing or studying chess compares and describes 
similar patterns and produce the ideas and moves used in the decisional 
generalization. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We think that chess is a drosophila more and more, with respect to various field of 
human thinking, mathematics included. It is so because chess thinking is purely 
abstract. Therefore, the features of mental processes that we tried to highlight in chess 
may be probably usefully connected with thinking in other disciplines.  
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The mechanisms we deal in this work, in particular the construction and 
deconstruction of configural concepts leading to their objectification, are sensuous 
mental operations realized by continuous use of generalization. As we have shown in 
the last paragraph, it occurs through various levels of generalization, and it may be 
interesting to compare them with the layers of generalization suggested by Radford 
(2010b), where the layers are defined according to the generalization afforded by the 
semiotic systems in which the generalization is expressed.  
Generalization is fundamental in chess, because it allows the player an useful 
employment of his/her experiences. Generalization is not, however, the only thought 
mechanism involved in chess thinking. The second basic mechanism is abduction. 
Abduction allows the chess player to improve his/her experiences and knowledge 
during the game. Generalization and abduction, we tried to show, play an important 
and complementary role in chess thinking. 
To end with a didactical note, let us note that various studies show the positive 
effect of practicing chess on mathematics learning. According to our experience, the 
benefits of chess practice related to mathematics learning are particularly observable 
in scholastic environment, dealing with grade 1 to 5, working with teachers and chess 
instructors for a minimum of 30 hours of chess practice. Nevertheless, there are a 
many possibilities for new inquires and research on chess thinking and the role of 
generalization as well as other thinking mechanisms like induction and abduction. 
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